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by Joseph Hansen 
PIONEER PUBLISHERS 
116 Unhrdty b Nw Y d  3, N. Y. 
beeianing ef the year some Cuban 
came ta see him. "Tbey talked 
at lemgtb, with fire, of the Revoludrn, 
but I Med h vain to get them to tell 
me wheber the new regIme was social- 
Ist or not." 
Sartre was prevailed on to vislt Cuba 
a08 -mine for himself. Upon leav- 
ing, he offered bis imgmsdmr in en 
of UPW inter&, ''Ideologk y 
Revo1uci&" ( I d e o m  end Rwolutlon ) , 
which was published i the March 21 
isme af tunes de Rerrdurd6R. 
tirst mrprbm one in Cuba - 
above all if you have visited the coun- 
ir&y d the E4ast -" he wrote; 'If the 
a w t  abnce  of ideology. Yet it Is  
not ideologies that are lacking fn thtP 
eeatury; here too, they have represen- 
t a w  who from all sides offer us their &. Your leaders are not ignorant 
of them; they simply don't employ them. 
Their adwrsarie formulate the most 
contFadietov reproaches: for m e ,  this 
absence of ideas k n o w  more than 
a trick; it bides the mast rigorma Alam- 
ism which does not yet dare name itsell; 
some day the Cubanx will remove the 
am& and communism will be installed 
in the Caribbean, a few mil# from 
Miami. Other enemies - or, on occa- 
don, the same - accuse them of think- 
ing of absolutely nothing: 'They are im- 
provising,' I have b n  told, 'and after 
having done something they elaborate a 
theory.' Someone adds politely: 'Try to 
speak with the members of the govern- 
ment; perhaps they know what they 
are doing. Aa for us, I must confess that 
we know absolutely nothing.' And a few 
days ago at the U n i v d t y ,  a student 
d @ c h d ,  'Autonomy becomes all the 
more i n d w b l e  &we the Revolution 
has not defined its objectives.' " 
Reprlnkd horn the Summer I %O 
International Sodalkt Raview 
In reply to all this, Ssme continued. 
he had heard a thowand - The 
RwoIution is a pmxh whlch fwses its 
I d e a s i n & n . " T h i s ~ , t h e M  
ExistentIalIst philcsopber and play- 
wright held, was logically u n m b l e ,  
but a little abstract. Citing a practical 
interest in cl-bg up the question of 
the theory of the Cuban revohrtiopl, he 
declared: "1 t is n m  to -. 
certainly, the u n d -  - sincere or 
feigned - of those who say that they 
don't know anything or who repmacb 
he revolutionary movement wi& noi 
having defined its aims." m u  hia
flmt query - is the Cuban revohtian 
s o c ~  or not? - Sartre recomhd 
that the gudon was not well put, due 
to the fact that from a &tame one 
tends to be a "little abstract, iallfng w 
those big words that t d a y  d t u t e  
symbls rather than pmgmus-" Never- 
theless. ' ~ ~ i 9 m P  L i b i d  -? 
Many inteuects they are convinced 
in good faith that a Redutfon ought to 
know where it k going." 
Sartre hlieves they are wroae. The 
French Revolution of 1'189 was 'Wig 
blind." The same ones Uwbo voted for 
the Repubtic were mmar&hb two 
years before. EveryWag !erminated in 
a miUbry d1ctatmip that saved tbe 
rich end reinstituted the mamrchy. And, 
through the mirages of an ~e~ ri- 
gidity, how many vadlhtim, how maw 
errors, how maw dips backward the 
Russian Revolution expwfenoed durifg 
its first Y~BFBI*~ A NEP by cu- 
c u ~ c e s ,  "failure to foresee" the 
w r d i  of the rwolutionarp mopemenu 
In Europe or even its own hpoietion. 
"The new ideas were e x p d  within 
the framework of an id- without 
flexibility, bwmiag c m v d  hto b- 
n h :  S&ahn in one country, the per- 
manent revolution; inventions which it 
was believed could be j d d  thrwrgh 
quotations." 
Sartre, p r m t i n g  hiP credenthls in 
M a  fhM, ia dear4 not to k taken 8s 
a PeFfoua theweSldon of revolution. 
Frosn bin brief -Ira about Europe's 
two -test rewlu- ir would be 
bud to -pe the d u a I o n  that rev- 
olutionary theory k of little use. Never- 
fhelm.. he &ids it scmdy sntMyh# ta 
m4 in rtsponse to the qwdon in 
Cub& "AH yW g ~ h g  tO build So- 
chlhm?" tbat - - d&e it8 
own ideology." 
Sar&e found among the leaders of 
the Cuben ElwolutIon We concepthns 
which he at Llrat thought were contra- 
d i c k y .  One of the Ieadets told Mm 
that the Revolutlm ia unable to fake 
a long-range objectfve '%@cause it is a 
re-action. or If YOU Wigk something that 
rebounds." 
"He memt by this that your people, 
placed before a too powerful neighbor, 
never had the abmlute initiative and 
saw themselva o b w  t~ employ every 
recourse of intelligeuce and enerm to 
Intrmt a counterblow. And he added: 
'How can we make long-range plans 
when we can find rrursel~e8 invaded 
tomo~~ow, or sufier the most inimm? 
m o m i c  prerunrre? Guerrilla war, re- 
shtame to ecnnamic bids*, would 
necessarily chonpe the stmcture d our 
society. All we know ie this: we will 
not be defeated. But the conditions d 
our struggle would change us: It will 
be m o t h e  Cuba that the victory.' 
I u n d e  that he mead that your 
'ImgrovLsatfona' &re not, In firc4, any- 
thing but a deiensive W q u e :  the 
Cuban RevoIuffon must &sf itself 
constantly to the enemy maaeuvfxs. Per- 
haps the measures of w n t e r b b w  wLH 
give bfrth to a counter-ideology?" 
However, other leaders talk4 about 
t h m v e s .  "I asked them questions 
a-t their Iives, about the evolution 
d their thought. All oi them told me 
that ttre Rwolutiom had d r m d  than 
far beyond thek first p & t & ~ .  Vi-t 
clpehes had occurred a d  they had Do 
confront S E V e m  realities: of mir 
old Men& had not fallowed #e moW+ 
mat; o#w% reluctamtb Im -I-- m, had become ?ad&&&," 
The two concepts at first m e d  in- 
compatible to Sartre. "In the first case, 
I thought, we adapts b i m l f ,  m e  tan- 
mrhes, everything must remain fluid 
and principle3 m w  not constitute a hIn- 
d r w .  In the wand, the revolutionmy 
movement treMmes more profom4 ia a 
sure and, as a whole, regular manner; 
there exkt then an order d march, 
points of reference, a dietion. Perhaps 
ft muld  la? too ambitious to call fhe 
discovery of an orientation an 'ideology,' 
but it must be admittea that the de- 
man& of @ d s  have changed tbe Ideas 
of these revolutionary leaders." 
O h e d n g  the r@clgrocal relatlon be 
twem Ehvana's ma- end Cash, dur- 
ing the Cuban leader's apeech following 
the blowing up of the freighter L,u Cou- 
b w  as it was unlading mmitions for 
the defense of the country, Sartre came 
to the rollelltgiom that the two concepb 
ucounterbloww and "radlcallzPtIonv were 
actually interrelated md that .  they  
marked the en* eourse oi the Cum 
Revolution. In the rest of his essay he 
sketch# thh i n m l a t h ,  b & d n g  
with the appearance of bourgeols-demfh 
cratic patriots who had to find a chss 
base in the "agricultural workms" In 
order to buiId an effective movement, 
then take up the agrarian came to carry 
through the overthrow d the BsMa 
d I c t a M p ,  and rinaIly undertake ra- 
ace1 economic measures to cormlidate 
the victory and defend the c & t q  
against irnpmbbm. Sartre sees as the 
possible end goint of this development, 
should the foreign preasure prow suf- 
ficient, "self-radicalization" o i  the Cu- 
ban Revolution and, as its economic 
counterpart, 'Vadical daUzation." 
N ~ & , a f e w w e e k s a f t e r t h e a p -  
W by Emat0 UC?@ Gueyara wm 
wblmfd in Havana.+- As o m  or the 
top iisllrcs oi thcf C u b  m e n 4  
that -W r i h  is, of 
~ t o k ~ I n t f s k ~ c u r a r  
-,- ht& w, perrLlla war- 
r I . ' *  ..*, . 
fare, he is an undoubted authority, hav- 
ing ?wed this by his military kader- 
l i p  an the dvll war. At present, as haad 
d the National Bank, he h in charge of 
Cuba's foreign trade, a post of key im- 
pwtance In the defetw of the country 
and in the development of eowramIc 
plaunhg. h Cuewa de E d l h  will 
undoubtedly be widely dhassed in rev- 
olutionary elrcIes thraugbut Letin 
America whwe Cuba k now pre+mI- 
nent as a so- of hphatlon,  
Largely a handbook, the author duak 
in considerable detall with the peacueal 
side oi guerrilla warfare in a cwmtry 
ltke C u b  under the conditions of a dic- 
tatorship like Batista's. As Guevara 
m, vlrh~ally werythinp he pments 
is takeu from the Cubau experimce an8 
may not be appucsble in every fnstance 
to other countries wen thaw having 
much in common in the way of dhaie, 
tmgraphy and do-economic inherlt- 
ance. I &aII not deal with thk aspect 
of the book save to note the striklng 
portraft that emerges of the average 
Cuban guerrilla fighter. 
The firmest m i h m  prevailed; the 
fighters living I k  monks m Spartam. 
An iron ptinclple of the leadem was b 
lead by example ". . . the chi& must 
constantly offer the exanrpb of a crystal 
cbar and sell-samltidug m." Ail, lead- 
ers and m&s, shared and ghared - - no enceptiom. Thia included mt aPly 
the occasicwal bandoub d fobaeeo but 
the rugged fare, the hunger, tbe riahs 
md the worst bd&@u. AS the m- 
rilh fighter's h h  under 
indodrhstiom, he became a rwdutloa- 
ary, charged with the m d  
fervor so charae* of f- de- 
dicaml to a great cause. 
The small guerrULa bands grew until 
they were able to hold d d e r e b l e  ter- 
ritory where, as a power dual to h t  of 
Batista. they were able to &ive a de- 
monsttetion d what thdr gwerrrment 
would be like. The m a  famen de- 
veloped hto a full-- army af 
such force, hrrrdneas and that no- 
thing LI the country d d  stand egaInst 
It. Batista's iwEes melted away. The 
bavbwdos. the M e d  011- mamhd in 
Recrulkd from the countryside, triumph -into Havana, & of them 
chencea were that be came to the Sierra B~~~ the wrmdera of the 
Maestta barefoot and unable to read or ltB1 for the - time- 
write- He had gone through a period 
of testing, not Ieast of whlch was to 
obtain his own gun and ammunitiw. 
m& likely by a raid on a continsent of 
Bathtans armed forces. He did not come 
with blind faith, Observing the guerriua 
leaderahip in action he had hcom con- 
v h c d  of its honesty end tatmeess, the 
hc&B oi i fs  program of agrarian re- 
form and fb wiU to carry the struggle 
through to the end 
The gumflla's life was not easy - 
under constant threat of death, he was 
often like a hunted animal, scurryhg 
from ower to cover. He had to make 
ligbtnLag marches by night, attsck, and 
flee. Sometime as much aa three days 
went without food. Sleeping In a ham- 
mack at beat, under a strip of nylon to 
keep off rain and ins-, k n s h  was 
never absent. A bath, a shaw were lux- 
uries to dream of. (Guwara notes that 
each man could be tuld by his individual 
odor and the whole force by its acrid 
smell, "repelling -.") 
1s it possible to draw more -1 
lessom &om th is exmerice thsn the 
best .practical way to o r w  & u e d i h  
fore- and later convert them into an 
army? Cuevara thinks sh He m t s  
some rather far-reaching emdudam. It 
is these, of camMer&le i d d o g i d  in- 
ter&, rather than such items as a - 
recipe for making a Molotw ooekEall, 
w how to trsp a Shermaa h?k, that 
will undoubtedly arouse most mterest, 
Here iti bow Guevara begina: 
"The armed victory of the C u b  peo- 
ple over the Batiste dicta- has 
been, in addition to the epic triumph 
recognized in the news of the entire 
world, a mwlifier of old dogmas an lad-  
ing the pogulsr masses of Latin Amer- 
Ica, demonstrating palpably the capaFiQ 
of the people C liberate t h e m  
from a suffocatdns govarmnent tbmgh 
werrwa struggle- 
"We hold t&t the Cuban molutioa 
made three tundamental cordributions 
to the mechdm of the M u t f m a r y  &-fly adom our Cnnstltutlons are 
mwement la ,4merfea. They ate: syspend~I or Lgmmd. Under these con- 1 
~ ( 1 )  ~b forces - a Bltions, the workers' movements must 
w a r m t h e a r m y .  be e l a n d m e ,  without arms, in illegau- & and running a w m m  dangers; the 
U(S) It *wm necm to situatioa the open i l e ~  is aot so 
wait until all tbe d t f m  am W f= mt, InhabItaab mpportlng the the revolutim; the h h m d a n a l  center end pw where 
can create them. the repressive forces cannot reach." 
"(s) In America, the -loping bia goint further, Gue- 
of the armed stntWe must be vara a p d e s  thet since guerrilla action 
bmdammta1ly the comlamIde." Is- b& FonducW wild and lime 
Explaining his iirat two conelusloas. mulakd p W ' *  the struggle ior the 
the Cuban revolutlonhy 'leader says &man& of the people k mntered "pm- 
that they @ agafnst "the quietist and even a h &  exclusively, 
attitude ai rerroluthnmiu or -do rev- m the plane of changing the d a l  com- 
aluthark who take cover rtnd cove up Wth d land bancy; that is, the 
far thtxr mnctivity, under the prebxt guerrilla is above all an aperlan rev- 
tbat - a p m f e  army a&ng aluthllry. & en- the desire of 
can be dose, and some 0 t h  who tee1 tbe great peasant mass tO be o m  of 
that * to wstf m a  in a me- the had, owner d their nustas of pro- -form, the -** ductim, of their a m ,  of all that 
tive and -- are my* they have dreamed of tor years, of what 
prrwnrpylnp tbemsdvw constitu* their Iife and will a h  con- occ~lerathg tbera" 
G u m  mmgnbs, ot mume, that Atute thek ceme0ery." 
&jdve -&tim of the two m= oi guerritla -re. 
must ripen beim tb I- Guwara sets aside the me which h . 
t h a l  center" can be set up. UWhere a cwnplemenm to the m e  of b& 
pwerament b w  eome to war through regular armies "such as the crmz d the 
any tormofpogularcdtaticm, fraud- U k x a w  in the 
ulent or n& and main- at le& an unian." ''what faterests us," he con- . 
appearsnce ot cwurtltutlonal, legality. it tinu=, "is the case of am armed -UP 
is Impossible to predpltate g u d l h  *fdt conmufs P- the 
wadarc h the pcdbifitiea of civic stxw& a- the conatltutml m, 
struggle have aot been exbawted." w h e t h e r i t b e c o ~ w m t . w ~ ~ -  ' 
On the third polat. w~ ~o grsater a - whiEh -- 
i n t m s q m ~ ~ ~ i t e e l i ~ l ~ d a s a n i n ~ -  tln--ithew*sd- 
of top b d e r  *- all th- c w  whatever m y  
be the Edeolo&al structure that ad- views the C u b  rewlutlon In Its wider =* the -, economic - pspects, G u m  declares: Is given by the aspiration to pwsem 
third contribution b fmdammt- the land." 
ally of atrategk hqm+ and must be Seeldnp other -1- to sup- bd 
a call to attention far those who attempt m-lhtim the Cu- leader m C  
with dogmatic criteria to center the first of 1 1  to China: 
m e  of the m w m  in the mwementa "m's China h g h  as an eruption 
of the dtiea, completeIy forgetting the oi workers' nuclei in the South that is 
fmmense partiEipatim d those tn the detated and almost annlhitatd. It be- 
counmide hi the We of all  the under- comes established and hitla- ib - 
deveioped countries of the Americas. eendant rnarch onIy after the lonp march 
Not that s t m g g l ~  of the mess- of or- to Y e n .  when it s e t t h  fn rural ter-8 
gadzed workem an to be d q e d a t d .  rftwim and places aa the base of de-., I 
the analysis *ply ch- a rea- mafads the agmrh reform. The strug-, 
criterion B estimate the paasibiIitks gle d Ho Chi Min in Indochina fa M 
under the diLIicuit conditions of armed on the rIc+gmwing peasants o p p r d  
struggle, where the guarantees that by the French coIonial yoke and with 
I I 
this force it conthuw until 
it deieata the eoloaIaW. In both cases 
there Is an lntcrruptton of pabiotic war 
a@mt the Japanerre hva8er, but the 
ceonomic bse of the struggle for the 
land doea not vanlah. h the casa of 
Alglem, the great idea of Arab national- 
hn has its ecoaomie r e p h  h the ex- 
ploitation of almoat the entire arable 
land of -era by a million French 
colon5; and fn same countries iibe Puer- 
to R h ,  w b  tbe parttcular conditions 
of bhe f laad have not p a t t e d  a guer- 
rUla outbreak, the nathal spirit, 
woubded to the depths by the discrim- 
Ination committed daily against them, 
has as. its base the aspirations of the 
peasantry (although in many cases it b 
already proletarlanhd) for the land 
which the Yankee invader seized; and 
thb same c a b a l  Idea was what ani- 
mated, although In different projections, 
the small holders, peasants and slaves of 
the haciendas of eastern Cuba who 
c l d  ranks to defend together the 
right to p o s d o n  of the land during 
the thirty-year war of likation." 
Guevara does not rule out the action 
of the city proletariat altagether. But, 
sfnce city terrain is the most unfavor- 
able for guerrilla warfare, only limited 
acts are pmsible. In other words, re- 
versing the situation of the Ukrainian 
guerriIlas, the workers can only com- 
plement the struggle of the guerrilla 
fightem in the countryaide. At a ffnal 
point in the civil war, howevk, when 
the guerrilla forces have swelled into a 
peasant army capable of regular battle, 
Ihe city proletariat can find it passible 
to engage in mass actions "whose BnaI 
remit Is  the general strike.'' 
I N THE: clasing section of his book, "Analysis of the Cuban Situatian, 
R.eaPent and Future:' Guevara offers 
some adlirtiona1 oonaidaatrons. After 
more than a year in power, it is nec- 
essary, he thinks, to take "the exact 
dimension" of the Cuban Revolution. 
'This national Revolution, fundamental- 
Jy agrarian, but with the enthusiastic 
partidpation of the workers, the m l e  
ofthemiddleclassandeventdaywith 
the mpport of the MuskiaUsts, has ac- 
quired great conthemtal and even wmld 
hpomme..," 
The Agrarian Reform, ''extremely 
harsh" for those whom it displaced fmm 
ownership, put in motion KNlW (Na- 
tional Institute of Agrarian Reform) 
which now "advances lh a tm&m ar 
tank" breaklng up the bi# Irtd31oUngs 
The Agrarian Reform was uantifeudal" 
but occurrd in ucegltnlFst surrwuld- 
in&' and against the moa~opAh. Thus 
it bad to help the peasants and agri- 
d t w l  workers with credit and with 
machinery end "People's Stores." 
"Of all the characteristb - 
ing it from the other three great a m -  
r h  reforas of the Amarleas (Mexico, 
GuatemaIa and Rolivla), what appearS 
most irn-t is the decjaion to carry 
it thmthrough to the end without favm or 
concessi0118 tm any claw." 
PFaductiopl of such i m m t  items 
es rice, pain and cottan b devebopZtle 
rapidly, constituting 'the center of the 
process of plennlag." Cubs's rlob sub  
aofl mxmuces have heu rettieyed . 
through petroleum and mining laws 
which may turn out to be "as impm- 
tant" as the Agrarian Reform. The pro- 
fits of foreign mnqmlbb have been 
limited. The small islaud oi Cub. la 
leading the aniicolPlnial alxuggh i the 
Americas and has k e n  petmLtted to 
take "the heroic, gInrfous and dangerous 
post of the vanguard." 
''Small countrie~ haw &t 
now to maintain this posItian; Gush 
mala . . . which fell be* tbe direct 
aggression of the colonllids; a d  B+ 
Uvh . . . which yielded More the tar- 
rfble difficulties of the struggIe w t e  
having provided three of the e*ampW 
which a w e d  the Cuban Rwolutiom *I 
a fundamentel way: the suppmshn af 
the army, the Agrarian Reform and the 
nationalization of the mlnea . . . 
'Tuba knows these examplee, 
the pitfalls and the difficullieu, *but 
knows a h  that we are fn the dawn oi 
a new era h the world; the colmial pM- 
lars have been swept down by the pop- 
ular nationaI struggle in Aaia and h 
Africa. The tendmy today towad 
ullificatlon of the people does not come 
from their religions, Lrom their c m q  
from their amti&, racial a W t y  or 
lack of It: it comes h m  the economic 
sidhdty of their sacial conditions and 
from the similarity of their eagerness 
for promeas and recuperatien. Ash and 
W c a  shook haads at Bandung; Ash 
and Africa wUl shake hands with native 
and colonial America W g h  Cuba 
here in Havana." 
Guevars notes the de~line of the old 
co1onW e m p h  in face oi the poguiar 
upheava, "Belgium and k o ~ d  am 
two cerlcatures d empire; CwmaUY and 
Italy 1-8t their e o f e s .  F+mm debates 
in the bitterness of s war she muat 
lo* aad Eag1anB. diglomatic etnd awl- 
ful. IIquidaW her @itleal - while 
malnwng e c d c  ronnecflw," 
The UnfM sates has replaced sDme 
of the old capitallst coa3al but 
know's that this is %ansitmy." Wall 
skeet's mala fIeM k Lath k r f c a ,  
But if "all the Latb-Amrhm m~,le 
r a w  the banner of mty, like Cuba? 
fJm monopoW would tremble and have 
to mmmmcdate themselven to a %new 
polfflco-economic situation and b sub- 
stantial pruning of their gains." That h 
why the manopoUstiP doday athck Cuba 
as a '%ad example." They acaw Cuba 
because of the Paad it hag pohted ouf, 
road of armed & struegle 
against the mppmedIg invincible armies, 
thexoaddstruggleinwildamstocon- 
sume and destroy the enemy outside Its 
bases, in one word. the mad of dipnity." 
Guevara winds up dbmshg the pm- 
sible variants of Imperialist 
agafhst Cube and the meam of combat- 
ting it. For defense he mun& h e  on 
"internetima1 sddarlty'' and gumrilla 
warfare. 
L EON Trotsky remarked in 1940, UThe liie-and-death task of the prole- 
tariat now cansists not in inteqwetkrg 
tbe wmld anew but in remaking it from 
top to bottom. In the next epmh we 
can expect great revolutbdsts of action 
mt hardly a new Marx." 
Cuba, it would seem, has done her 
abare toward verifying thiB obwmatb. 
In their pattern of actfoa, the Cuban 
revolutfonari~ feel certain that they 
have point4 the was for all of Leth 
America. The prmf i~ their own sue- 
cess. But when we seek to deterinhe the 
exact meaning of their deeds, MarxM 
clarity is not easily found. 
Are we to undmtand fmm what Gue- 
va*a sags that the -try MS cUs- 
placed the proletariat as the leading 
FeY~lIttbWy c ~ S S  - in the Wide&- 
veloped buntrim at least? 
I I s ~ ~ w h a t d ~ t b i s s i g n i f y f m m -  
dutlonary perspectives in the highly in- 
dwhWhed c o w M  Must the pmgiec- 
tlve of p~ktar f sn  rwolutlm be can- 
ddered uarealtdic there? If @, how 
W tbis && the def- ai -1~- 
tions like the one in Cuba? And what 
doesitsignifyfmhsmmityansudtan 
h as the poslbilttg of a Third World 
War? Can the proletariat by r e v u -  
tiwrary means hope to prevmt a nudeaz 
cmfht or mnst this p d b t l f q  be re- 
l h q ~ e d  ss utopian - d a a  the 
famm take the lead by mau11Ihg 
merrUa wadare? 
Guwara hdsts,  quite comecur tlme 
fwta team, that Cuba now stands in 
the vanguard of the Lstln-hnemWm 
rwohdiou. This wwtld man to h p a e  
an oaUgath to examine the th& ' 
aud program that revolutk, 
pmtidarlg if Cuba has made a new 
discwEry. Why Bfd the 0- mpen 
to go wrong? How did the Cubans hap- 
pen to atumble upon the right road? If 
for no ofher reapon. such an warnha- 
tioa could m e  ialrw decisive for the 
Meme of the Cuban revolution. Yet 
even Orrwara seems to wade such ques- 
thnq conifnIng W f  to a cryptic ref- 
erence - the "quietist attitude d rev- 
o l u ~ ~  or pswdo rwolutionarlm." 
What revohrtiomrh or -do revolu- 
timarh? The StalUts? The Aprfstms? 
W e  are left fn the dark. 
It b quite true that the Cuban rev- 
oluthnari~ do not have any time fm 
sp- tine themi-. They ere prae- 
dcal people, swampd with taslu. Tbeg 
scarcely have tfme to I& up from the 
day-and-night schedules they have had 
to follow since they came to power. 
Yet lil@re ere wme questions about 
wbIch the Cubans should be able ta 
say a gmd deal. Fur example, how did 
it h a a m  that the weegoweriul Com- 
mudst pmrty proved incapable of lead- 
ing the repolution? How did it h a m  
instead, that a handful of dedicated 
students were able to build a revolu- 
wary mov-t from virtually noth- 
h g  and accomplish what tbe Cwnmu- 
nbt party tailed to acccllllpliah? The 
ankwer to thJ should prove -e 
to all bi Latin America and the entire 
w l d  fnt that matter. 
Such topics, however, are not q 
high on the a- of the Cuban d u -  
4ionarh. Their boldness and muenes 
d Ow& in the field of actlon have no 
mmeqmndfng reflection in the field d 
thewg. Despite h a r a ' n  wveglng con- 
. cludons, the thoretieal lmns  of the 
Cum Revolution have not yet been 
dram. 
By way of beginning thLs task, let us 
d b l i s h  some prelimiDary mts of 
departure. 
The founders at the July 98 Move- 
ment mrkd as petty-bwrakois dem- 
m a t %  Fidel Castm, for example, ran 
for Cmpess in the 1 1 2  electfans as 
I a member of the Ortodoxo party {Par- 
tido del Pueblo). Mter .BatistaTs March 
10 coup d'etat, Castro & d l y  Bet out 
00 the road to fnsurrection. TWs led 
him wI*in a year to the famous assault 
on the Moncada f- and then to 
prism and exile. On M m h  1% 116,  he 
declared his Wuslorrtnent with the 
~ O X Q  party and announced the Jub  
20 Movemwlt a6 an indep&uknt revolu- 
timum orgatllzatim. Thla p d  to be 
~ W a w r b o i ~ n , ~ t e d  
to the overthrow of fhe Batbta dicb- 
brahip. Although occasmaal blofs were 
W e  with othw groups and partieri, the 
-me oi its politics was t~ remah 
independent and not to swerve from its 
prlmarlV objdve. I t  was a rwolutIm- 
ary youth movement much c 1 . 0 ~  to tbe 
campus In the kgbanhg than to either 
a e  factories or the fields, although later 
It ~ a m e  powerfully undw the in- 
fluence of the poor& paasants and 
amhl tura l  workers. 
Why weren't these youthtul revolu- 
ti,- attracted by 'the Communist 
party? The answer wwld appear. to be 
quip aimple and even obvim The 
Connmunist par& was not revdutlnnary 
enough. In fact,.it wes Wt 
ary at all. I t  w w  tainted W its 
ot the Batista Mm?mv=rwtj= 
S t a S I a n o r h i s ~ w e r e ~ m P p -  
n e b s t o y w t b ~ * p l t h = w u I O  
smashthe--Amooe- 
thlnga, Macow's g o b  at - 
mn; ik-, mRb- ad 
s t a b  quo, which W M  faitMlm * 
by the c?mmmbt l=tb '- 
the world, was r @ e I h t  to 
aries &king above dl thbq@ ta alter 
ihe -tuS qub. 
T h e m w l a l s a n d ~ h W ~  
they might have fomd In ihe early 
S o a t  .leadem were not available to 
them, or were at ~.~ * 
the successive layers of Stdidst mnd 
The C u m  W e d  to whnt waa d m e k  
at hand - the lee- of the 
penden- mwemeqt of the past .ten- 
tury. These t@& had a Pirtw k k -  
Ing in the StdhM mmment: hmab- 
Implacable toes of tyranny of any kbi, 
they were dedicated m m  capnbk at pe- 
cepting msrtgPdom to advance the caw? 
of freedom. 
Thus fr came about that the JuIs P6 
Movemmt marched under the banners 
of freedom, equality and -. 
as li the main problem d a modern 
revolution boib down to m+m&hg 
1'178, 15'89, - h Cuban - 
1866 and 1W. !J!b 196659 sh&e 
clmly paralleled the d 1895- 
BB, including the op&og a d  
the final advance of the 
forcps. A l t I l W  they did Id 
plan it that way, the Cuban m- 
tionariea, with their M, even hm 
elme physical r&wmbhnce to the bema 
of the past wntury. 
Morewer, they toog pow=, as a S a  
stre-, qot at the b n d  of tha 
proletariat but at the h s d  of the 
wasan-, a elam ttrat is vmWd 
ihe pre-capitalist era. 
T h e p a t t e m s e e m s t o d d y ~ ~  
t h m  that the proletarian mvdulkm 
ham supereede8 the -. Ye0 h 
it really invalidate the mdn lawn of 
the world rwolutIonery g m  as mueh 
as it e m  to whem y a ~  trial: at the 
Cubm Bevolutica mere4 In isoktion? 
If we connect it with the nuah hbma- 
t h a l  events of the past fed 
lmm iaetrr of o c m ~ p o r a r y  
at ow! aiim La: (1) the 
dedpsntno decay of mpi-. which 
Imptk revolutiawy outbursts no mat- 
*ex what h barriers; (2) the decades 
of defeats uf the pmletarian revolution 
in the capitaILt centers due to khc per- 
n i c h u s  influence of tho Cummunkt 
parties under cantcol of the bureuucrativ 
caste that usurped power tn tht: lir?il 
workers' stale. 
That the main lhrust of thc Cuban 
Rcvoluticm from thc. bag inn in^ was 
against capitalist imperhliam h welt 
understood emwrg thw who ovcrlhrew 
&atMa. When McKinley intervened In 
the d v i l  war in 1898, the tt~*dom 
Iigbters had virtually won tndcpendencc 
fram the Spnlsh colonial master. Mc- 
Kinley a i m 4  at b1oEking Cuba's irrde- 
pendeacc and brlnglng ttie island into 
the orbit of Wall Stred Amrican oap- 
ital man became dominant In both the 
island's economy qnd politics. Under the 
Siatc DewUnent, B a W ,  I l k  MBchado 
befo- him, ruled in the style of a 
gauielter. C o t ~ ~ u a n t l y ,  It is not BiFfl- 
nrlt to see that the &  mob^ farce 
fa  the Cuban upheaval was American 
capimkm. 
It f perhap mt so ealw to see that 
B a W b  mle of a q b  of s aentery 
~ m m o r e ~ ~ t h e a i m L l a r  
spenaiChiang~~'arole!fachiaFa. 
Haad the Cuban partv re- 
B g o n a e a t O ~ ' ~ ~ a i ~ t n  
I= with tbs and 
~ - o P ~ - a l B p ~ p a d b g  
W S u l y 3 8 M o v e m & , h ~  be no 
mwbt that ammg W t b  hfsdschw 
w d d  haw bee~l a Cube. In- 
a t e a a ~ c u b a n ~ ~ t h e i r  
m ~ I n # e ~ ~ t o * B 1 s r  
w q . r p w t t o a a ~ f u s t a I s t h 0 ~  
-Uti l f+ed--v 
tbe Anrr?rfclm w m k m ~  to ihe 
deMlftaung cult oil -" 
The pattern was ftmdammtaus tb@ 
sa~ne as mt iollowsd b~ the Commuaist 
~ t s ~ i h e w o r ~ f p I o r t b  
W a r g  War 11. Th€a h th true explena- 
tItm for the fael tbat laora tban forty 
yemm after the Odober 1917 Ravolu- 
tian, not a &I& CammunM pwiy has 
bd a rev0lutl:mmv atruegle to smcw 
a n y w h ~ i n ~ w a r i d s a v e i n c b i n a  
and YugasIavia; and in 
stances the Iestdershfp 
Une Iaid down by Mo 
proomi to be the mosc -flu1 b 
rn ~molutfm in the crperlence of th 
mktarht. Thb w- so not onIy in lGee- 
many, France and Spain hefore World 
War 11, to mcntir~n only the most out-' 
standlng c x a n l p t ~  wtwrv the workem 
rrluld r?aslly hnvv Lake11 jxrwcr. but aitw 
t t~ i *  war, whcn mlll~rmr nT wa~rkem; 
nwkd htc~ the Cnmtnunist fmrttcs In 
Francc and Italy and rrthcr countries. 
If twcIvc d&mlncd lnrm on Pico Tur- 
quino proecd snEflcfc!~t to slnrt the4 
avaimchc that buried BAtIsta. what 
cuuldn't tho Italian Camnlunisl parly ac- 
compIIsh wllb its millinns af membw 
If it display~4 similar r~v~lut ionary de- 
termhation and devotion to the stxiatist. 
cause which ft claims to represent! I 
On a worU scale, taking the entire' 
span since the advent oi Stalinism, it 
b the same default of l&er&ip In the 
warking c l w ,  due b StaUnlSt csgIoib-- 
Uon of the proletadan tendency to ttttp; 
toward L e  rmt workers' state, that 
Ltnally regutted in the extraordinar# 
spectacle taday of revolutlms breaking 
out ia dm- of cwntrfes - not under 
Cammist, but under petty-bourgeois 
aad even hougda aationalIst leader- 
irhlg. One may hagbe  what LenIa 
~ i g h L  say of a Wiet Union camble of 
puttrag ~ t e I l i t e 6  In orbft about the sun 
and pho- the &her shte of the, 
mao9, yet 3ncapable of givimg d- h- 
8pImtb-t to revoluti~tl~+mAalist smg, 
gles ia otfier hand%; the Eonmlyt 
mbtadng them and thus creating a 
vacuum fn revohtionary leademhip! 1 
HO-, the exteasian granted cap- 
itslism did no1 remove the b b f d v e  , 
nacwsW for t x ~ d b $  the syskni. 
The meak d m  fact in world poEities k 
that neiam SWhbm nor imgdallsm, 
nor fhe rombiaatiom oZ the two w v a d  
-able of suppmtng  the tev~lutiaoary 
prm- hdeiinik.4, Thw could not gre- 
rent it from breakhg out fInalIy m 
1 
democratic buts that might wen mask 
the mletadan dh'mtion. !t"hw d d  mi 
prevent the revolutionary process fmm 
fhding leadem capable of at least mak- 
b g  a Winning wen rhonah thev might i 
~ m e e t t h e o b f e t E f v e n e d - a o p  
it- at the a m  awe. 
-;Th&ktobhtaway tha'SWbbt 
L-e, the revolutim t d  beek a 
~ I e d i s ~ a u d t w % a 8 e t o u t .  
' T h w - b a s 1 e B u - m -  
m-a meding * -a 
obCmba,bnkUfllOlearfhat?he 
m a d ~ i B m w ~ b 9 * -  
m. 
X t L n o t s a e e s s a r g t g M m t O ~  
L W 9 Y  
C u b a . A t l d i t i s t h e l ~ b b c d r a w n  
~ i m v e a l l b t h e w m l d a O c l a w h ~  
'm*, ibe lmd&mapPQd 
ones w h m  &e r@voWbary wwtIr3 
t r ~ . O t r e e ~ l e s a w a ~ P l o m e w e  
t a l l l w i ~ ~ ~ t f o n a l t k r e v -  
o l u t i a n a r y p ~ t h a t t R f l l n o t ~  
f h e ~ t m t ~ b t t h a t t h e m a h ~  
f n r r o d a t g ~ e s w l t h t t p e ~ ~  
and that it wfll not l e t  mabtfat 
a e a t l n s o i l e a ~ g L n t h e ~ b t -  
*.- hamhg. 
A ~ e ~ ~ l m a e r t b R g l l i ~  
d the -king elass anywhere in the 
WaLd WaY wm such enerOy 
a n n a r s p a t e h i u b ~ o u a o b t h e ~  
that iu re- evetl the 
&mmk C u b  B m l u t h  will appear 
d r a w u o u t ~ ~ ~ w t o f p r ~ o a  
InWandaW+Tha5howsver ,wi I l  
not debact from the debt the working 
people d Uie world owe the C u k  
TO *ally brea$ the od S W -  
h, lt nmmmry to crawl an 
Y e x l ~ ~ c & p a b l e o f  thr  will 
prove cagabk, we tbW, of - 
W t b P ~ W t s ~ t a t t h e  
~ a f t b e ~ ~ t i a u .  
A Z r e a d p ~ ~ o f ~ a t e ~ b I e .  
The July 26 Wvmmxrk came to mwar 
mtIn1888butInlM@:dpPItBIna 
few - it beEame amply eEear that 
m o t ~ t b e a i r n p l e b t ~ w c B i m s  
d d  b aehtePea W t  far-Peacllhg 
altaratlam in tbe w. Hefe the 
=mhtmam ~0del8  - 3om the 
wat~~~ktrscould ofier IIttIeintbeway 
0s mmkm. me& t b w y  waa h R a -  
m t e .  
But-~-&-to* 
october 1m7 ~1~ b no 1- 
a matter oi m. MDdeZP exist and 
~ ~ a a t ~ e x ~ ~ g o o d  
and M T o h & m l v e ~ o w n p r o b -  
~ € h e C u b a n ~ ~ a p e ~ t l y  
i w e k h g t o ~ m e a b r e s s t o f ~  
~ a m d ~ t t L P 1 3 L n e i i l t h l s ~ .  
TBua the inherent teahlcy d the 
Cuban holutlwi to develop in m 
pholetarian direction haa W mder- 
at&! wd there -em m&MW 
i n ~ i d r e c t w e g t h s f a t e d C a a  E2 
h3 pdounay atfeatd by the pml* 
~ r e v o l u t i o n l e d b y L e m f n a n d ~  
** & this gatm of a c t h  cuts Its 
~ f o ~ ~ w e m a y ~ t h n c  
~ ~ e n m o i b c ~ b e r w l i l k ~ & e d  
d ~ i U t h e i d e o l ~ e t ~ C u b a n  
Revohtian. 
"No wvohian b ~ s  ever u ~ y w B m  wboIIy coincued with tbe emcep 
tims of it /armed 4y its pnrticipasis, aw could it do so.*'- Lem Tro&iyi. 
USTEN, YANKEE -The Rew1utiun in Cuh, by C. Wriaht Raills. hllan- 1 - 
tine Books, NEW Yak,  1960.192 pp. 50 cents. 
CUBA - Anasomy of s Rcvolutioa, by Lea H n b m ~ ~  nrrd Pad M. Sweez~ 
W l y  Review Press, New Ywk. 1960.176 pp. $3.50. 
I THE first stages of the Cuban Revolution, not much appeared about it in the way of searching mwlysis. Publicity was lars ly  agieational, 
whether lor or against. Consquently the worth of most early writings 
h h p s  largely on the accuracy 01 the reporting and the txtent to which 
documentary material is included. This is especially true af some items, 
highly laudatory of the Revolution and its I c a d ~ s ,  by authors who have 
since gone ever to the counter-revoIutiun. 
The situation t h y  is quite different. The character and meaning of 
the Cuban Revolution, of the goventmeat that displaced the Batista dim- 
torship and of the state now in power are under intense discussion 
rhroughout the radical movtmenc on an international scale. The theoret- 
ical questions have come to the fore. 
This reflects the course of the Revolution itself. It began as an ill- 
reported and ill-understood rcvolutiom y demmratk movement in a small 
island ruled by one of r dozen strong men in Wall Sactt's empire. To- 
day it stands a s  a eolossa 1 fact in world politics - the opening stage bf 
the socialist revolution L h t i n  America, ths beginnink d the end d A- 
mtricmn capitalist rule in the Western Hemisphere. 
The two booka under review ate rtmoag the best in a new literature 
appearing about the Cuban Revolutim, a literature written by serious 
thinkers accustomed to probing fm the deep - lying forces and trends in 
modern society. These thinkers are fascinated by what this Revolution 
has revealed, for they feel that pcrlmps here m y  be found cIws to titanic 
revotut io~ry events now drawing near. As Hub~rman and Sweczy txprcss 
it: "ln Cubta they  are aclswlly doing u~bat yotlng peopIe all  WET ;be 
world are dreaming about and would l i b  lo do." (Emphasis i n  original.) 
Reprinted from the Winter 1961 
hatermtima1 Sbcilist Review 
Let's begin with Listen, Yankee. In writing &is b k  C. Wright Mills 
'splayed considerable courage. The author of Tbs Power Elite and 
Wbiie Collar, to mention his best known boks, staked a big rcpatatim 
ind high standing in academic circles when he decided to support the C
'Cuban Revolution with such forthrightness. That he weighed the issues 
is evident from the following statement: 
"Like most Cubans, I too bclieve chat this revolution is a momeat of 
truth, and Like some Cuban revolutionaries, I too btliew that s u b  t a h ,  
lh all revaIutionay truth, is perilous. 
''Any moment of such mil i tary  and economic truth migbi become an 
epoch of political and cnltum1 lies. It rnigbt harden into any me of sc-r- 
a1 kinds of dictatorial tyraany. But I do not believe that this is at all 
inevitable i n  Cub.  And I do believe chat should it  happen it would bc 
! due, in vety large part, to the tole the Governmeat of the Uaired States 
has been and is continuing M play in Cuban affairs . . . . 
"The policies the United States hms pursued and is pursuing against 
C u b  are b s e d  upon a profound ignorance, and are shot though with 
hysteria. 1 believe that if they are continued they will result in mote dis- 
grace and more disaster for the image of my country before Cuba, kfme 
Latin America, and before the worId." (Emphasis in original.) 
To help enlighten his fellow Americans and as a service in counter- 
ing the hysteria, MilIs presents the Cuban rtvolutionary case. As r 
succinct presentation of the main facts that led to the revolutimary ex- 
plosion, of the achievements since then, and of the aims, attitude and 
outlook of the main rebel farces, the book is a remarkable accomplish- 
ment. T cannot seeommend it roo highly ro anyone seeking a quick brid- 
ing, padcularly as a knowledgeable Cuban revolutionist, leaving aside 
diplomatic considerations, might give it to you on a visit to the istad. 
It's Not Stalinist 
The salient feature of Listen, Yank* is the clarity with which it pre- 
sents the anti-Staliaisr aspect of the Cuhn Revolutian. Most readers of 
the / n t e m t i m 1  Smialist Review will  underseand at ma, I am sure, 
: that this has nothing w da with the anti-Communism of the H m e  Un- 
Amcrican Activities Committee or similar bodies of witch -hunters ruad 
I counter -revolutionaItiea8 E n n  in most Cammwkt ~ z c k  where dtc cdt  
; of the late dicrator was once the first commandment, it is gencmlly ac- 
cepted oodsly -since Khrus hehcv's Twentieth Congress revelations aborrt 
Smlia's mimes and pmnofo -that w bc anti- Stalinist do~s not a 
mnticallg p a  you in Hider's camp. 
An d t s b i & 8  of the anitde of the Cuban revolutionists tawad! 
Smlidsm is patticdarIy impweant. The C a n  Communist party sup-. 
the rcvulwion. The governeat, in turn, k s  respected ia demoera@ 
ri*, as it has the dcmocrntk sights of other radi-1 gouginp. It ha#. 
nfrraed to eagqgt in any witch - hmtirrg and has denounced anri - Com- 
munism as n divhiw weapon of the counter-revolution. Tbis, plus th 
aid solickd from rhe Soviet bfoe emcmie~ (which uadombdlp sawed 
the Cuban Reyollltioa horn go@ d m ) ,  hati b c n  wi&ed m falsely pipic 
ttue the Cubn &overnmtnt as having eucc&d to Sdin i rm.  
The isiw Imppens to be cruchl in thc Udted Sesms for winning sup- 
p r t  for thc Cuban ReooJtlrion in sectora of t$c ~adr-unim movement, 
among inwlkctmtaIs and on the carapns. It is not just a m t r t r  of attempt- 
ing tu onrcanae bysterica1 Smlinopbobia. h these circles the mrth is 
widely known about &'s suppression of prolemrkn democracy, his 
b m c  - ups of working-claw pditial opponeata, mas& deportations a d  
assassination bP ~ocia l i s t  Icaders. &ny rebel - minded pcoplc in the 
Urdred States, who ofkmd their support to the Swkt Union, fck hmpi  
6n learning the icw about Stalinism. Constqwntly, out of fear of be@ 
burned aguin, hey are carrti~w. On the other band, thc rppeamace d a 
genuinely demoetatic sociatiat revolution couId mmiumtc them. Besides 
c u m t i d g  the only ap~crorg of the popnhion ready at ~~~~t to giye u 
Eair hearing to the Cubans, they arc an essen&t link in rebuilding a 
mas# soeiaZist mercment in America. 
Mills g i - ~  tbc question the importance it wanants, citing many fwts 
to indicaae the pformdly anti-Smlinle nature of tht rrvofution. Among 
these he notes the smss placed m immediate hnefim for rhe pmgdc, 
the d n e s a  to &tee and learn k m l I  fields, the freedom chat d c a  
Cuba so crhihtiug to m d h h ,  above aU dmac on *cation from the 
stifling atmospberc of kCruthphnd. 
On the decisive pofithal bct of kadcrship, Mills has hi8 Cubap po- 
mgonist WI~W ua en& lc-t (Ha. 51, explaining w b  the Cemmdsf p ~ ?  
is nut in power in Cuba a J why it is highly unlikely eve* to seek pwer. 
"Tbe plak fact is, otrr rev01uri0n has outdone tbc Cormpurmist sn avcty 
score. From Be begin& up tilI t d y ,  rlmya at every turn of wear and 
policy, h e  mvalution is alwayta faom than fhc Cuban Cornmunuat Paiy, 
bt individual Commww . In all objective hem, then, t ~ c  ore moch mbre 
f a d i d ,  mucb more revolotionary tbn thty. A d  that is why we sw wing - 
tkm,  rmtber tlmn tk m~etse;  thty are nae using us. In het they a m  b- 
h g  very gmtchl to ua far letting them in on the work of the cerolutiaa 
'*% ha, ehis ia the case gcncmlly with locnI Commnnist prties in 
; h t i n  America. In a real revoluriorr today, in lisltia America at least, tht 
! I d  C o m m d t s  arc to the rigbt of the revolution. &re in Cub,  cer- 
L 
t r a y  chc rwolucion has autpeccd them a d  does w evcq hont. Tbey at- r wnge anin  too kt= a d  with too litrle. This h.s h e n  tbe a s e  in C u b  
, and it stiU is tk case: They lag hhind ow rcvolarion." (Emphasis iq 
original.) 
1 The &nth is that SmLinism proved to be an iasupetabIc lmndkap fa 
, tbe Communist p t t y  of Cuba, no matter h m  rewlutiwr y - midcd its 
mnh were; and i t  was by -ptzscd by & ~ t m ' a  Jdy 26 M w c a n t .  
On the tbtoretical assemsrnent of the Cuban ttvolution as it seands to- 
day, Mills offers some interesting opinions. "Thk Cuban revoldbn be 
obscr~es, "has swiftly destrwed the economic basis of capimlism-br#h 
fortip mnd Clrban. Most of this power was foreifl-in hct, N d A m n k  
It  b s  now been destroyed with a thoroughness miqw in b t i n  - h d c m n  
histmy .*' 
la his socioiogical e s t h c e ,  Mills s~ys, "The Cuban rcvblmiona~ is 
a new and distinct type of Icft-wing thinker and actor. He is wither 
cepifalist aor Communist. He is socirtliaz in r manner, I kljcpt, both 
practical and humane. And i t  Cub is let alone, I b e l i c e  rhat Cub- 
bave a good chance to keep the s&&t sockty they arc buildkg pra-  
tical and humane. If Cubans me properly helpcd-cewomicaUy, techticab 
Ip and cultumIIy - I believe they would have a wry good c m . "  (]Em- 
phasis in ariginal.) 
As to political power, in Mill's opinion, "The Government of Cpb is 
a icvolutioaary dictatorship of the peasants and work~rs  ab Cuba. It is 
Itpl4.y arbiaary. It is kgkimieed by the enthusiastic support of a4 ww- 
whelming majority of tb people of Cuba." In lrmx NO. 6, thc Clrbaa 
spokesman specifies that it is not a Stalinist - type dicmtmship: 
"h the most literat sense haginable, Cuba is a dicmterqbip~obr bg, 
and for the peasants and h ~ :  workers of Cubu. That phrase, 'diemcaship 
of workem and pcasanrs,'*tas turned into a Iic by Sealin a d  under Stalk- 
ism. Some of us know &st. But noac of us is going abont our rtvaIutiam 
k that way. So, to undcxsmnd w, you must ay to disabuse yonrscif of 
certain imps and ideas of 'dictatwship,' It is the prc - S t a b  meaning 
d the p b t ~  that is accttr~e for C&. " 
I t  is iu the paLitiea1 m r e a  that MiJls exptesrcs the greatest worry fa 
Cuba. "'I do not like such dcphadcnee upan one man as exists in Ctha 
twlay, nor eht vkmLly absolute power that this WE mrin possesse~." 
However, #ills believes tkat "it is not enough either to approve or to 
d i s a p p w e  this bct abaut Cuba. ThPr b much too easy; it ia also p l -  
irieally hitless. Oot must underseaad the cooditims b t  have made it 
so; fw only tbea can one consider the pospects of its development.'' The 
coditions include the focm af struggle neadad to overthrow Batism, tbe , 
enamow ceunter-reroltyio~tp pessurt of the United Satepi, and Qc 
fluidity at rhe present aintstion in w&b democratic fams  bevc am yet 
h e n  wwktd out in the fiviag expcri~nct of che cevoldon. 
Castto's lcadmship in the Wkdt revoluriorrry smuggle brought him 
thicc trceptianal personal power, bw it is Uh' ewvktioa &at Caem is ' 
o p e d  to any leadership cuIt, is aware of the dmnw and will help the 
rwoldon to pas5 &mu& it. "ln my judpcnt," says W, "ant must 
take seriously this man's own attempts to shift roles, eve# in tErt middle 
of his necessary actian, and his m a  astute amnetm of the nebd t~ 
develop a more syatcmalic relation W e c a  a government of lan d the 
pcople of Cuba." 
"Anatomy of a &evolutionn I 
Ler us m u  now to the b o d  by Lco H d  n d Pad M, Sweozy, 
the tditms d the Maatbly Rgvispu, They  w r w  this after a three-week 
visit to Cub in breh ,  lW, publishing it 38 a spciipl ediskon of theit 
mapzine. Evenm s a w  &ted paw of ia The a d m s  took a n a h  trip td 
C u b  and ham mow p b b b e d  a supplclaenr, "Cuba Revisited," @cc- 
ernbet 1960 Lsuc d the Maatbly Review) whifh, X understand, is tcr be 
included in a mew edition of h e  book. 
The strong side nf Cuba - Anatomy 01 a RevolutioR La iw emphasis on 
economics. The authmt do a good job of s-king thr main #acts 
a h  C& under Batham, amilobk in sllcb b o k s  as Lowry Nelson's 
Rum1 Cuk, then turn ro cment ptoblems w k r c  tbey offer the result8 of 
&tic own invcstigstions on the scene. The facts h e y  haye assembIed 
arc errconiagiag Meed.  Instead of collapsing, as the capimIist p a s  bas 
been predicting, the Cabs economy has grown saoager. Consider, for 
instance, the mah crops, wbich have been the cater of a phoned ex- 
pmnsian driw: 
"Their 6daI amlame i~meased by almost one third in fbe lirst war 4 
Reuoiatim, a ~ d  h e  is RO d u d t  tba~ a eornpafabk rate- o/ aapaq'm 
k i n g  m i n t a i d  &is pear. China, it aarms, is not- the only caump 
xepablc of 'big leaps b r d ' l  Bat what c-thet country b s  eves s e e ~ d  
such s leap fomard in cbc *try fist year af a Revolution and irr the midst 
af ,a iu-crachiag r p r k n  reform? L a n  br miid wirhout e z a w t i a a :  ia 
the Cuba Riev&iutian the world b whessing a p ~ e s s  of soejo-era- 
aomic transtamtiw rurd vimUP;ortioa a t  is ia mafiy impomant re*Fca 
without any pcedcmt. Let the world look bird a d  &a* tbt appxoprinet 
conch&io~sb" &qptr*ath in .mri+l.) 
m n  the a p r h  d o r m  wms put &r+, +ti-. we= k l y  
aadc L the big pea8 ttut rbe Cubas .rich thtif " k k  af h w - h a m "  
would sped£ly king tbc cmmlc idusmy to ruin by shpgbte&g r b  breed- 
ing stack- of ir d top qmlitp. 'Xhe &piurn fwaats of the &- 
p s o s s d  w e  bet- wer* wt bme out. Hukman and S w w y  eitt 
I represeaathe ob h U-d M&uw P d  d A&- QrgPaSartbn 
who ,id rh*t while &a f2-s wem amifnble for the ,#Iarsd aa a doh, 
tfae~na m a  s ~ & g  60 w. 70 per ~t marc bee€ k mch, k%O, d m ~  cbe
previdus yeu while rfrt .sapply of beef a k  bed abo brca acp- 
p d  up "~hkfly owing to krt# feeding m a W s m P *  T4e d e :  
"Thttt 4 be np bats widegee &a this b e  (I) the Rwdatbn b 
a W p  -famed cfic staaSard of 1;- of tbt C b n  &sweat a d  12) 
this ntn a d  hi* standard of living hes come ta m y , "  
In poliriea1 m%tms, H d w m m  and. Sweezy- ia g c m I  h r c  m e h  ta 
be dcskd,  im my W m .  A few idhc ims:  - m y  mwp tq ' f ~ d t "  the * ' a U m d o r r  of Errankh D. Woacl 
vek" dth kvlPg "rbmgad@' the P h  headmat .  They dtm miti& 
ehs mme dmhbmatiua for withhaldhg rrcopicioa of Fhe Gms gmem- 
olknr and -8 it  p B e b ;  but &t phial akcessity of tippbg 
d y i  him to dm E'DR myth Mecb them from aesing RooatPeft's & la 
esmbtEsbg the E d  CIlbaa dim- a .d  Jag his b r a  &. 
E kdng .tb& certdhiess tbt , C u b  gcasaooy ro go tbcdy to 
-WcwaF ~oopm@=r, &heman and %.ccag ref- ta 14- oC 
Wgda laud te€- *h have shed at breaking up late haled 
esmcs infb smaU p m n r  bldings. "Morlt rrrdieirl thcwght, h s r  fm~ 
tb time of Mmq' they say, ''9 ~nerafly tejecaed t b  aim en dit dm1 
p m d  tbat mil- seak paanre  cultivation of the &l is hopeless$ h 
efficieac nnd thrt a s d  pcsaaatry is ioerirnbiy a rcacuonary, comtcr - 1 
molmimaty force. However, the Rwsiran Reoolutioe d o w t d  the dif- 
f i e u s  which coafronted ~ n y  attempt to go d k c d y  from a system of 
la thdia  to some fatm of collective agriculture. IU spite of themselves, I 
the Russian Bolsheviks were forced to distribute Be bnd to millions of ! 
small p s a n t s ,  and it was only much later after Litrce and bloody social 
struggles and frighfful agriculture1 losses chat they succeeded in es- 
eablishing the system of collecti~e and smte farms." 
Tbus they amalgamate Lctlin's adherence to the political position of 
EngeL with its direct opposite, that of Scalin. Eageh held that collcct- 
ivkation in sgiculnue, despite its obvious economic advantages, could 
proceed oaly io sccordance witb the will of the F s a n t s  themselves. A 
revolutionary government could seek to convince them by argument and 
exampIes but in no ease force them. That was how Lenin proceeded. 
Stalk, after first panderiag to the rich peasants, collectivized Soviet 
agriculture by h c c .  The camstrophic conscqncaees stiU plague the 
Soviet Union. If a real lesson is to be drawn from the Cuban cxpericnce, 
it is the adoantages to be gained by following the method worked out in 
theory by Eugels and put into practice by Lenin in conaast to the bnrtal 
method- used by Sealin. Hubetmaa and Swcczy credit Cuba's succcss to 
Castro's knowItdgc of the peasantty and sensitivity to their deepest w b b -  
es. If G s a o  i a  not aware of the thtorttical and hisrorical background, 
the coafirslation of cbc Marxist view is all the morr  notable. 
A serious political error wbich Hubemn and Sweczy themselves ad- 
mit in their postcript to the book wns the estimate that Washington would 
not s lash  rbc Cubn sugar quota. We remain uncermio as to why h e y  made 
the error. Did h e y  celcubtc that it was not in the kst interests of cap- 
i m b m  to do tbis and t h t  the powers that tK wodd recognize this? Or 
did they underestimate the deeply reactionary ebtncter of both the Dem- 
ocmtic and Republican machines? Fortunately, the politically astute 
Cuban leaders were n a  caught by surprise. As Castro indicated in his 
speech at the United Nations, they are well aware of the truc relation- 
ship between "tfie ahark and the sardine." 
I mention these imms with no rbought of disqwlifying C u h  - AN- 
tomy of a R#volutioa. Thy arc minor, if annoying, f h w s  in an cxcebnt 
report and strong defense of the Cuban Rcvotutioa. My intent L to sug- 
gest that if the authors have any predilcetioa it b in the direction of the 
Communist party. This gives certain of the things they say a bout Cuben 
politics much F i r e r  weight than tbey would otberaise have; fw, rep- 
resenting a break with their ptedilectioa, thest views were rmdmbdIy 
pondered may times aver before being expressed. 
h 
D From the migin of the July 26 Mo~emtnt in 1953 until the rebel a m y  ' was we l l  on the way to vkcory, Hubermao snd S-cezy d c c h , " & c  Cuba 
CP was cool to a d  sometimes criticalJ' of Casm'a oxpktion.  I h g  
leadership of the tevolution*owed absoiutely nothing to the Camrrmaisla..,' 
Ody Csstro, if he shwId join the Communirrt party, could pcrstladc any 
of the others to foIlow him. "Since no mspnsibfe obscrrcr, to dw best 
of OW ItPOrPIedge, has ever suggested that Fidel has done any such &hg, 
we conclude that the hypothesis of Communist infiIttation of the lender- 
ship is a pure figment of the anti - Communist imagination." 
Can the Communists get into position tp " wrest leadership of the 
mastsea, of the ieoolud~oary mbvement itself, out of the U s  of Fidal 
a d  his collem~ms in the army and g w c r w n t ? "  Hubetman and Swcny 
ridicule tbe possibility, pointing to the smaUncas of the Communist 
p r t y  and its hck of smadiag as against the size of CPseca's following 
and their rcrolurioaary r e e d .  
The a&ms go even further: "la our judgment, for what it is wortb, 
the Communists could makc no bigger mistake, now or in the EoresmbIe 
flrtnre, than to challenge Fidel and' his close associatts for tbc lender- 
.hip of the Rcvolutiw. Thcy would lose, and in losing they might -dl, 
do iaeprable damagt to the cause of the Rwolntion, which of murae ia 
miso thcir cause. On rhe other had, if they coinue to p w s e  bit pm- 
Bent course, they may play an impor-, and in some respccm p a h p  
an indispnsable, even if subwdinea, rok in the bd&g of 
in Cubap* 
To make heit meaning sti l l  c tcuu,  they compare the C u b  Com- 
munists with the A m c t i c n ~ ~  Commuaista in the New Deal period. "Thy 
worked hPid and oftca cfftetivclp trying of course always oo push mrtoa4 
somewhat tmther to tCle Left than they would whetwise tend to go. While 
t h y  won control in some d o n s ,  they were never in a pition to rmke 
a bid for political leadership i4 the corntry and never caused any d o r u  
problems except in the minds of the right -wing l n ~ t i c  fringe." L shorr, 
although the authws do not say it, since thc thiiies ucittrtt tbe Cdmn 
nor the American Commmists have played the d e  of rawlntimists. 
"All the e h r e s  and accns~tioas concerning the alleged Cormmiat 
cknrectu of rhe Cuban govcmmeat and/or Rewlurion tend to hide whmt 
may orra out to b hktoricnLly one of the most impomant facts abut tbe 
C h n  Rerolutian: this is the firm time -ever, anywhere - that a genwhe 
sdalist tcvolutim h a  beem made by non - Conmrmists?" (Emphasis h 
nrigima I.) 
Ca~tm a d  rbe rebel army, "ca1hg themselves neither sochlists nor 
Communists, in fact without any clearly f o r m u l i e d  ideology, seized 
p w e r  in Cub a k  rwo years of bloody civil war and proceeded with 
ehn and dispatch" to do what needed to be dooe."Mo one can now h e -  
tell the f d  implications of this smding k t , "  HubEtnmn a d  Sweezy 
klieve, "but no o w  need doubt tb t  it wi l l  open up new riartrts not only 
in thc.reah of sdal thought bu; also in tbe realm of revolacionary 
a e ~ o n , ~ '  
Although there is eoaddemble difference in tbe angle of view, in em- 
phn Jai, io political inchtion, and in the wav they express whft  tbcy 
obscmcd, it is clear that the impresshs nbich the Revolution made on 
C. Wright MiUs on the onc band a d  Hnkmao-Swcczy on the ocbet were 
not pat17 different. Tbe similarity cxteds to other fields. 
What Icimd of social order docs Cube bavt? "For our part," declare 
Hubcrman-Swetzy, .:'we haw no htdmtim in nnsweriag: tbe new Cuba 
is a socialist Cuba. '* (Emphasis in original.) 
HOW did it get b t  way? After he seizwe of power, "thc aspect 
which the Cuba Revolution first presented to the world waa that of a 
quite nspembk middle-class regime, " This gave rise to mny misunder- 
amndiogr. However, the real power remained in the hands of Gstro. "A 
sort of dual system of government began to emerge, wida Fidel on one 
B;& and U d  and the mbinet on the other." Tbc "pamdox b t w e a n  thp 
essentially revolutionary chatacter d the regime and the prcdomi~nrly 
liberal-to-conservative p~rsomrl which represented it &fore the world" 
was resolved by March 1 S O .  Two of tbc hadmarkg were Casao's resigna- 
tiw h July 1959 to force rbc resignation of U m t b  a d  Cbe Guevam's 
assumption of the presidency of the Nado-1 Bank In November in place 
of Felipe Paaos. The Castro regime carrisd the revolution rhrmgb to the 
estnblishem of a phoned economy. 
Communist Party Viewpoint 
Cuba - Aaatomy o/ a Revolution wan aalutcd with vexed ctiticism 
from spkcsmen of bwh tht Cuban a d  American Communist patties. (At 
this writing they have not y t t  got around to rcvicwing Mills' book.) The 
CP finds it obnoxious to c h i d  that ~ I E  lab1 'socialiar" sbopld bt mp- ' pLitd to Cnk. k k  a mtiolral d e r n w t k  rewldon, you see, in whlsh tins 
national bourgeoisie SUU pkps aa important role and in wbich the meed 
for "unity" is foremast. In arldition, Hukman-Sweezy slight the m h  of 
the Communist party in the Revolution and the increasingly 
wle it will play aftex the prolemrian scsge apcns. 
The two derelict authors answer th criticism somcwhat &SKCB~CE~ 
f&y with a f- in their postscript: "Mow that the big majority of dae 
mwms ofpraductiw are in public ownership, and the regime is mpidIy de- 
yeloping a cmsciarrsllp aceiahc idedagy, the Cmmmmunist a r w t  
ajgaiost c.hssi&ing Cub as socialist appears more m d  more clcaxly as 
mere verb1 gymnastics. Thr reason for the- C o m m & t s L a d o ~ ~  
pit ion,  however, is straighdmwd eaough: they don't wan: to admit 
that it is passibk for sbeblisrn to be h i l t  under mu- Commda Icadcc- 
ship*'* 
Qnc wfsbrs tkat Hubtrman and Sweezy wuld venture to arrralyzc rhis 
reIuc~ancc d the Communists. The quesuw, would seem not dmpmmnr 
aad vcry dcMstLy wlatrd ro heir own belief that the Cdma Revolden 
b s  o p e d  up "new vistas not d y  in the teah of social thought but 
also ia the realm d revolutionary adon." bn't  the failure of tht C b  
Commumbt p r t y  central to this  fa^ -reaching conclusioa? Pouldm't a 
b l t d g e  d the reasons far tbe frrilute bt *f cw182dcrable mluc to atiter 
C;ammuaLt parties - to dm ttvaldemq-mindcd rarJr and file if noc co 
leaders wbo never #use "my acrious probhms"? 
h h e  dispute between the Commmism and the sdiror~ of cht W y  
Review, it appears to mc tbnr Hubman a d  S r ~ e u y  ~ ' I C  the aporyc 
cmr. Iu fact they Emned thc C o ~ a n i s t  patty thcmedciaos wig b i r  
own tedmobgy, lf each of the svrunaies in  the Soviet Mot, k l & g  
Albania, is "socialist," then why sbwld this tttm bc denied Crrba, rhieh 
mw has a planned economy - a d  h r  geerter freedom than an9 prf them? 
The fact is rhst "socialiar"' was wed by Sualin in the yeam m f k  
p y ~ h w i a  eb a mislabel for Swigt ~wiety. Lr wss a wey of @g d u t  
yoll can bdM "aucidism lo one countryay" Thh e y e d  iato the hamis 
of tbe worst cncmies of the Soviet Uaian, for they ntvtr rirsd of agreeing 
a d  even cmphesizkg tbmt a o ~ h l i s m  was what tbe Savicr Udan had all 
righr end &refore S m W m  and s d d i s m  w e  one a d  the samt cbhg 
and if &muh went soeislhr you'd hse democsaey a d  get frameup 
srials a d  eonccmmcirra aamtpa here, ma TO CU& the badge **so~iali.;r" 
on Cub m y  &US - rmEonumdy - k mEta as a -hat d d w  
boaor. The repgmncc the Cubno f n l  far much h t  goc. by the namc of 
'l&oty" is not with- god p f i t h f  jnsrlfiutim. 
h the early dmyn the Soviet Union was n l led  a workers' '*d& 
bmepuqsdc dc~~rrm&m," h& added. It mas smialiat in tdemcy: 
that ir,  it was rn m n s h l  formatiw on cht mad ta aoe iahm but not 
there by a Ion8 sbt. Nw wnld it reach socialism rn im omn resources - 
much e concept, hmd anyone suggesttd it io Unin's t k ,  add h.rr kea 
dismissed as self - coaaadictory. The Swiet power was m w d i m g  - chss 
conquest in the intermtiom1 spuggle for a w a l d  - wide, scientifhlly 
planned society built on the f d t i o n  of capitrtlism as a whole, or at 
least on the combined resoorccs of sc~eral  hdusuially advanced coun- 
tries. 
The concern the Bof heviks klt for terminology was not due to an 
aesthetic pleasure in splitting ha*. Prceidon in  applying labels reflect- 
ed their concern w e t  knowing eractty where h e y  stood in relation to 
the goal still to be achieved. It was a good ttadieiw, well worth emulating, 
like much elac in Leninism. 
What Is It? 
If Cuba is not "socialist" and is highly unlikely to achieve swial- 
ism by itself om oat small island, what is it? 
The Cubans themselves have been reluctant to say. Professing some 
disinterest in akpusc questiaas of theory, t h y  have poliely k i t e d  
rhose of heir supporters aad well  - wishers who nrt better iofomed in 
~ u c b  matters to have a t  it. Meanwhile they propose to movc ahead, with 
or mithou labels, to work out probkms ehotpcrmit no delay and ehat have 
kept their limittd persoonel going twenty - fom hours a day. As their own 
guide, they find it sufficient to follow chc broad generalizations ot a 
humenism concerned with the fate d the humble. If you can rcII a guajiro 
from an imperiPList and hold gwernwnt power, it seems to work out a11 
right. 
This pragmatic approach has added to h e  tkareticnl pmsfe. If tbc 
Cubans don't know whether Cub is socktist or not, how is anyone the 
to b o a ?  Jean Paul &me, on visiting Cuba, came away with the e m -  
viction dmt rbe world was dtoessiog sametbiq completely novel - 
revolution impcIIcd by blows ham an impria l i s t  power to respond with 
comtcrblows, each more rndical than tbt previous. W o u l d  a rcvoIutiw 
driven f m r d  by such a process ereate irs own ideology? Tbat rc~lains 
ta be seen. L nny n a e ,  Same found it a refreshing conaast to what he 
rs the secmrian approneh - applying a pter~nteivcd ideology co 
, atimutatd Eke Same by At Cuban Rtvolutioa, have dtcidud 
adst thew breaks d m  bfrae snch pheno-, W h a t  pra- 
are in kfarxism far a rcvoIurioa, obviously socialist i~ 
powered by the pcasaaq and Icd re-vuludonis~ who bve 
s d  ~ocialbt aims; indeed, seem ta have bebe hi~imited m the 
orhorn? It's not m the book 1 
pravhions for such phenomena, pubp it is time 
It would s s t m  a fair e-h e r c h p  fop r revolu- 
one. On the other hand, what b o b  do yon read.? 
Paradex of BUSE~S 
The C&n Revolution i~ not the f k t  to have given the Eh*orctirhs 
#-thing k 8 b  to cmsidcr. fie Russian Revolutien e~ceedcd it in that 
=pa. En I917 chc cache world socialist movtment was caught by sur- 
I ,+, iaehding the Bohhevvik party - not excepting even Lenin. Soe- 
khpi wielding power ,at the head the wcrllera snd peasants in a bek-  
mard mnntrylikc Rws*l Itwas~~'t in the book. PelL.. most ef tb t  h k b ,  
The Russhm Revdudon was fommare in ha*ing a leadership as 
.mt in @pry as inmattion. Four deeder ago it was common knowledge 
' in tbt so~htist movement t b t  one at hs,t of the Rugslan k d c m  had 
~ e c o t m t d  ia theory for rht pectrlmrities of tht Russian Revalution in 
aU its atah Hoes - same ~ l u e  wars before i t  Bsp#ensd. His name was 
Leon Trarsky. 
- T-s theory of rbe Pemment Reoolucian pcady fueilimtad rhr 
the m&tVik V ~ ~ P P J ~  gkh& = V O ~ € U ~ D B L ~  mdn: &C t 2 b ~  F8-
SMC c ~ c ~  of the hpt of the2 a d o n .  But if Ttmsky k d  nag 
beem dm, had nor made his p r  heoretieaL cwdb*n, we may trc 
$me tbat Lcnia, con-a soehlist politicha aad man of -PA cbPt 
he was, w d  hve lad the BobiePiLa bo paw- just tht samc awl .M 
acElllp.tc reflectian In t h e q  d the Revmluh mould have come lam. 
1 mntion this aat oo1y to defend ehe dght of rbe Ctha Revol*ioo 
to hawe it= wove pecdh&i*s but= h w  frsra BaEskik theory to rttcmpt 
to explain termin of thtae pccdkidea .  
Tbr main power in che Cdmm kevdurlqm mas thc pcusantp (as In 
R.ossL). But paamnrry shded h the powerfirl -8s of agrkdmd 
wakcrs, which, bemuse of tbt mk ob &c a- m, canartcurtd 
the mwa rlymtmic section of tht CCfibFn poktiat. The a p e 1  w&- 
em solidly b & d  ebt Roolurion. The city workers favored tbe Revolu- 
&n but r e *  not in position to b n d  it ( d i k e  Russh) for tao rcmsoas. 
(1) The d e n s  were amp@ in the amit jacket of "mujalismo": that 
ia, n bweawmcy tied directly to the Bmtiaa dictatorship. !2) Thc politi- 
cal ltmdemhip wan held by the Con~m-tutiat party, an organization devoted 
to ''pmceftd cocxtteaee," t'peopIe's froatism," and the cult of S t a h ,  
an ormnhtion wbicb as H & m n  and Saeerp put i t  diplomatic~Ily, 
I 4  never awed any serious problems.'* (The CP leaders acturIly went 
so far in avoiding causing any serious problems for Batism that &ey 
p i c ~ c d  him as a m a  of LC people and took posts in his gwttnmeat.) 
The mim demands of h e  pcaaanay were nu cad to hunger, an end to 
bti.t.'s srftge killings, a d  a p h n  reform. (In Russia: BmdI PcaccI 
h n d l )  These demandm k m m c  tht slogans of the July 26 b c m e n r .  
By 111 the crircria of origin, aims and social following, the July 26 
Movement was a ~ t t y  - bourgeois formation, but an cx~tmcly radical one. 
It had one plank L its program which separated it from all similar group- 
ings a d  which was to proor decisive. I t  made a prkiple  of armed sttng- 
gfe  without compromise spinst the Bausm dictatorship. To carry out this 
aim, it oreaked a pasant guerrilla movement that has been compared 
to Tito's and bdao's. Parallels can also be f o d ,  however, in the rich 
c e r o l d o ~ r y  experience of Latin America, including Cuba itself. Its 
formation was not as novel as its success. 
Character of Govcr~imeni 
On coming to power, the July 26 Movement set up a coaLitiw govern- 
ment that included well-known bourgeois-democratic figures - and not 
in secondary posts. In retrospct these may have seemed middle -class 
decorauons or mere camouflage hiding the real nature of the government. 
It is more accurate, 1 think, to view this government as  corresponding 
to the political aims of the revolution a s  they were conceived at  the time 
by its leaders. 
But such a government stood in cont~dietioo to the demands of thc' 
insurgent masses and to the commitment of the July 26 Movement ro sat- 
isfy these demands. Thc Revolution urgently required far - reaching in- 
rmds on private property, including imperialist holdings. AB Cascro anti 
h i s  eollnborator~ moved toward fuUillment of the agrarian reform they 
met with resismnce horn their partners in the coalition, a resistance 
chat was considerably stiffened by suppat from Wall Street, which viewed 
them as the "aasonab1e"tlc~nts in e regime packed with beerdcd 
"wild men." 
As Hubermea and Sweezy cwrcetIy obsemc, "a sort of dual system 
government b c p a  to eourgc." The disphcement of Fel ip~  Parm by 
Che Guevara in Nommber 1959 marked a decisive shiftand the resolution 
of tbe govttnmcn~al crisia, whatcqcr hang-overs from the coalition still 
remained. Tbe gwcmmcnt t b t  now existed was qualitatively different 
from the costlition regimc. 
I 
I 
Its chief eh.racotristics were a genuine interest in  the welfare of the 
bootom maam of rhe population, readiness to e n w t  the defense of tbe 
Rer~Iutioo to thtm by giving thtm arms, clear recognition of the identity 
of the main enemice of the Revolution and resoluteness in disarming and 
combating them. It m a  even free ham fetishis rn of private propetty. Yet 
it did not think of irsclf as smLPst. It did nor proclaim smialist aims. 
What should we call such B sarnge govunwar? 
Among the great discussions aganized by the Bolsheviks in tk first 
€om congresses of the Communist Infernational was m e  precisely OQ this 
qncstlon. Deeply buried under laadsCdes d Stalinist p'opapnds, the 
minutes and resolutions of k t  discussion are not readily areibble. 
When you unearth them, p u r  feeling is one of shwk at eficir rimeihess. 
Did the Bolsheviks really discuss such a question four years befae 
Castro was bwn! 
fie Bolsheviks analyzed several varieties of "workers and peasants 
govetnment"; that is, radical petty-houcgeois govcrmtnts, in- 
diffetences that would cause a revolutionary- soeiaht p r c y  to a6Ew - 
port w to refuse support. They ~ S Q  left o p n  the possibility br- 
of variants they c o d  n a  readily foresee at the time. The poems1 ImW 
they used for such regimes was "Workers and Farmers Gme-** 
Here we must c x p o s t u h ~  a bit with the Bolsheviks; they also called 
the dicmtorsbip of the proktariat a *'Workers and Farmers Govet~mtar." 
A rcprcsentadve from theoretically hckwmrd America might have aaktd 
fw distinctive labels so be could more easily tcli them apart. But the 
Balsheviks discussed chb point, too, and felt t h c  it would n a  be car- 
fusing so loag as everyone was clear m the difference in content, s h e  
the first kind Qf government would likcly prove to be aalp a aansunt 
form preliminary to the Lscttr type. 
Of course, rhr Communist dckgatcs in 1922 eotlkl aw sisloskt smh 
a change witbout the helpful presence af a genuine revolucionmry - SOC- 
ialisr party such a& the Russian workers had in the blskriks. A b y  
quesrion mquirirrg our attention, therefore. is the absence of tbis h 
in Cuba. To find thc answer we must nun to the world situation in which 
Cuba is 1-ked. 
Death Agony of CapitaIism 
The most prominent conditioning force in international politics tadrm 
is the deep decay of the capimlist system. Leaving aside the effect 
sucb heats as a n d a  major d e p s s i o n  or atomic annihilation 
i n  a thud world  war, Cuba h s  expcrieaccd the decay of capimlism in 
two specific wags: (1)Tbt deformation of national life through imperialist 
domination - monoeulfurc, super profits, hunger, disease, ignorance, , 
dictatorial rule, etc. Q)The economic and diplomatic suanguhtion a . 
power like the U.S. applies to a colonial nauoa seeking independence. 
The moves emanating from Wall Street and the State Department, as m a y  
observers have noted, powerful1y aecckratcd, if they did not make in- 
evitable, the radicalization of tbc Cuban Revolution. Eisenhowert 'hst" 
Cuba much the way Ttnman "lost" China. 
Next in impormnce to the deatb agony of capitalism is the existence 
and the growing power of tbc orbit where capitalist p~opcrty rehtions 
have been transcended and planned economics constructed. Showing wha~ 
can be achieved in economic, scientific and cultural progress, not to men. 
tion sovereign standing, these e o w i e s  serve as practical object lessons. 
Their tendency to magnetize attention, especially in the underdeveloped 
areas, has become an active political factor that is now powerfully 
saengthened by the possibility of securing materia1 aid ftom this source. 
The Soviet Union, by its mere cristcnce, bas always been - even in tbt 
terrible yesrs under h l i n  - e radicalizing fmcc ammn oppressed pro- 
ples. The attraction wnat enamortaiy increased by the Chinese Revolution 
and the fresh example which ChiDa b r  provided of how to b e a k  out of 
age-old stagnation a d  imperialist oppression. Cuba has'bten affected by 
al l  this in the most vivid and co-tc way. 
The third feanue of world politics is the long dchult of the Com- 
munist prtics in providing revolutionary-socialist leadtrship to the 
working class. For decades this ~ignificd betrayal and defeat in thc most 
promising of revolutionary situations, Today it has finally begun to 
signify the emergence of eltcrnativc leadership - the masses in the 
underdeveloped ereas, having lost fatalistic a ccepmncc of hunger, misery, 
ignorance and rutble~s  exploitation, k v e  bceomc imptient and art p h -  
ing forward whs tever leaderships are at hand. Nationabts have filled 
the vacuum at least temporarily in many aress, but tk d n c y  is toward 
I much more tPdic.1 cumma. Noahere ip thirr to be sten with pam clarity tkaa in Cub. 
I 
Finally, tbuc is a tendency among rbt t&oonEst more-nts d 
mwly emerging countries ia the Far Enst, tht Middle Wt, &iu m d  
Lath Amcrkm to seek -1 e n c ~ g e m e n t  a d  auppac. The Cll;bllD 
rrvoltrcioais~ for etnmplt, M in close touch rich the A I e r b a  fmdaP 
fighters. They k a r t  diplomtic rchti~lls with  Yugo~Lvh, Indi*, a m ,  
em. Sckon To& and Socbrno hate been h w d  g ~ e w  im HP-. 
L m d  is a hero in Cuba. A radical move m k n  by any ob cbcm tbt 
proves suecessbl bas big i m p c t  on all chr akts. For ~ m n c e ,  hsscr's 
eizurc of the Suez Caw1 when Egypr, suffered the combbed a=& d 
Brimin, France and Israel made a lasting impression. 
I 
Iti the light of this international background, the scrirs of Eounter 
measures taken by the Cuban g o r e r e n t  uadtr pressure from the S t a a  
Department arc seen to have an ideologicll migin that does no violence 
to Marxist theory; i n  bet these countermeasures art exphhblc  only 
by a &oty grounded h tbc international class struggle. 
Character of the State 
Whatever the coasciousness of the Cuban t e r o l a t i d m ~  m y  br.c 
k e n ,  not a single miw madtmken by them war e l w .  
. "Inrervtntio~~" of tbt I r t h d a  a d  d e s k  a d  f e i g n  W b t C P L a -  
iogs was undoubtedly as Cvbaa sm the regal ph, bor it f& a pe- 
- 
ccdcnt in chc ''coatml" escrcised.orrr prirmte e q k e s  lpdcrtbe ' 
Bolsheviks prim to the esablishmcat of ad- umay~ewnt d id-. 
A s i m i k r  stage appeared in the C h k s e  Re*dution. The -@ti- 
and aationalkatims are i ikewLe far from norel. A gm-at mwopoly 
of foreign made is in the Russian uadition; and the planntdeconomy which 
Cuba has now kg- is, of courare, recogairccd by everyone us in thc 
pttcm inithted by the Rusoin  workers and  asi in^. 
I n  the October, 1%0, bsoe of Poliricaf A/{#irs. James S. Alkm, s 
spokesman of the Communist pi ty ,  hbtls these aa " ~ a s u r e s  of r ma- 
capirelist type." This effm to avoid the label "socialist," ma a d r a n d  
by Hubcrman and Sweezy, is nct very satishctay. Are the d 
similar kind in the Swict Union, Eastern Eutop, Yugoshtir, Alkrb 
and China a L o  to be hbefcd as "of n sfate - capimht typeg*? E q  
not. 
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Aside from tbis, Allen's position has anorher h w .  W h t  about the 
smte? Ls it capitalist? Can a -pitatist state carry out such measures 
snd mtil rtmin capimlist? Judging from the shirks of h e  conuter-rev- 
olutionaries sad the hotb on WnII Street's mouth, it is not possible. 
The bet is that the state structure began to undergo alteration upon 
Castro's coming to power January I ,  1959. For good and valid poliual  
reasroas, Casao insisted on smashing bath the old army and the old pol- 
ice force. Tht krson of G u t e m a h  bad been well  absorbed by the July 
26 Movement. A ntw army and a new police, h s c d  on the rebi forces, 
repheed the old. A nationwide militia was organized. 
One could have decided t b t  this was enough to require us at the time 
to all Cub a workers state. But the prcmise for such a conclusion is 
&at the conscious aims of e l m  leadership are revolutionary-sochIist, 
openly .yaclaimed, so that it remains only a question of time until the 
entire state smucture is altered to conform to the needs of a planned 
economy. This political p m i s e ,  of course, did not exist. It remained to 
he seen what coursc the pragmatic leadership would take and whether 
their v k i m e d  political aims would kcomc altered as they sought to 
put into effect tbc reforms they advocated; or whether in  sticking to their 
political positions they modified or gave up their social and economic 
aims, Tbe outcome could odg be determined by the struggle itself. 
The results are now in. fn the cwo years since chc victory, the hold- 
overs born tbe old state have been sloughed off in the key positions al- 
though they may sull hold autboritp in some sectors. With the completion 
&ween August-&to&, 1960, of the nationalizatioan in the major areas 
of Cuben iadustty , a new sure had come into being so deeply commimcd 
to a planned economy t h t  Cuba's course in this direction cannot naw . 
be changed save by nu imperialist bvasion and a bloody civil war. 
Since the mascending of cmpitplist property relations and the coa- 
socuctioo of a planned economy correspond with the economic interests of 
tL working class and arc objectively socblist in tendency, we must, if 
we are interested in emact ~rmioology, call this a "workerr state," 
signifying that it  is a s tate  committed to the task of carryingCuban econ- 
omy and society forward tbrough the transition from capitalism to so- 
cialism. 
ProIetrvian Democracy 
It is true t h e  this workers state Iacks, as yet, the forms of ptoletu- 
ian democracy. This docs not mean that democracy is lacking in Cobom 
Pat morc d e m w c y  ex* t0d.y in Cub thPn ertr er in td  d t r  m y  
pvioos  regime. k docs meaa th t  a w t  b e d  oa -ha, pas- 
ants and soIdiers em+, or s- focm of co~raeib in rbe d-atic 
-1 of the government, h o  not yet ken worked out. Mills' ohm-' 
tiom nbur  the concea&~~iOll of PQfl'er in mc p r w n  8re accumte. 
lhmist theoag admh &c poooibilky of s i t l l a b  ia which no alter- 
Andvc aim9 saw sueb eomceamtion of p e r .  --, it rrgarda rhis 
as cxcepdwPl and dangerom to tk -1- -6 d tbe work- 
U S  and It k ~ & n  of +-h# h * -m&Sd~ d thr 
saPgglc. Tbe norm is zbe cmwion of demaunry into all p b u ~  of tk 
nation's life. It is n a  just a q u c s t h ~  of d e m o a t i c  .r@m bu of or*- 
hing the most po.pedul dtfense and brhgiq the poacr to kar  
in mkying oui thc stmcmal changes and cw&wting the p l a n 4  eon- 
omy. Consequently, nhile defending the present Cuban p+emwnt fram 
amck from all quarters, PBaarists advocate the t~rlitst possible d t ~ t l o p  
meat of palemtian fwms of democracy in .Cuba. .It woPM see* =If- 
widcnr that l i a  would add p d y  to the p o l i t i d  defense of the Rcr- 
ohtion, atrom a11 as ?a tmmple w k emdated in Otbec co&s. 
This is che tendency in Cuba, as Mills nwes, and we must join him 
in ardcrrtIy hoping obst &it famcioia presswe horn Americas hq&lism , 
will not lund to retro~eesriion. 
What Next? 
A mew stage in die Cuban Revolurion is nota ope* up d tbt p a t -  
est interest and imparmncc. The leaderg have cowkkdy demon~m&d 
Wt &cy really meant it when they mid they were pepred to cazry c& 
Elitwlurion through to k s  necessary coarlwinn sro ma- &ere ic took 
&em. What have k e n  the coscquenccs irr their thiukhg? 
hoking back, they must wrc with s o w  astoaisirmcnt, I imagine, 
rbat ir ppgpCd impassible ra c a q  through simpk humrtnistic aim, aIl 
4 them long proelaimed by the bourgcoia s&ety t h t  toppled f rd l iam.  
*bout takisg wasmes that transcended capim1ist ~ ~ c g  &tiam. 
Capimlism doesn't work for &.poor. To fulfil1 tbek desire to turn tk 
promise of a bctrcr life for the h d l e  h a  rcrtlitg, these men of powerfrrl 
wiU found they had ro put Cuba w the road to socinlisaa. They discov- 
ucd this through practical erpcriencc mnd not through prccauccived po- ) d-. I t  is almost lib a laboratory test. What rb.ories did it confirm l. 
, disprove, or mat we wipe the slate of theory cfean and start fresh? 
Is this experience not worth evaluation? Wouldn't the wey be smoothed 
h rtwlutioniats in other htin-American countries, for example, 2 they 
h e w  the reasons far the course that bad to be mken in Cuba? Surely tb 
experience will be simitar ehewhac in Latin America sad other coati- 
mnts as rcrolutioniars follow the crample of thc Cuban vanguard and 
bring thtk people& into the mainstfeam of history. 
Up to now the Cuban leaders have a p p r c d  as p a r  ievolllcionists of 
action, Perhaps some of them m a p  now venture into the field d &tory 
with commensurate contributions. It is time, we think, to attempt to bring 
the theory of the Cubn Revolution up to the level of its pactkc. From 
such a dcveIopmtnt ail the friends end supprters of the Cuban Revolu- 
tion stand to gain - not lesst of all in tbe United Smtcs where the suc- 
cess of the July 26 Moocment has brought new hope and inspicatian to 
the radical movemen;. 
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